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Job training for transitional workers and disadvantaged individuals 
is of keen interest for governments across the globe. Advancements in 
technology and globalized trade make some jobs obsolete or move them 
to lesser developed countries. Such structural transitions mean a sizable 
number of workers can lose their jobs. Also, inevitable business down-
turns lead to cyclical unemployment, which disproportionately affects 
disadvantaged workers with low human capital. In light of structural 
and cyclical changes in the labor markets, governments in industrial-
ized nations have tried to support disadvantaged adults by retraining 
them. In the United States, training or retraining programs oftentimes 
have been accompanied by evaluations. This chapter briefl y discusses 
what we have learned from these evaluations and then focuses on the 
related evaluation methods literature that informs how we can best de-
sign such evaluations in the future. 
In the United States, there have been several major shifts in the 
goals, organization, groups targeted, and funding of employment and 
training programs. After the employment programs of the Great De-
pression, MDTA (1962–1972) was followed by CETA (1973–1982), 
JTPA (1982–1998), and eventually WIA (1998–present). CETA trans-
formed a number of population-specifi c job training programs into 
block grants, which were then given to the states. This marked the fi rst 
step in a devolutionary process that saw increased responsibility for job 
training delegated to states and localities. JTPA further devolved re-
sponsibility to the states. Later, WIA consolidated a number of USDOL 
job training programs and created One-Stop centers for job seekers ne-
gotiating their way through an otherwise bewildering system of federal 
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job training programs. WIA includes all adults aged 18 and older, as 
well as dislocated workers and disadvantaged youth aged 14–21.
The early evaluations of MDTA were nonexperimental (Perry et 
al. 1975) and largely rudimentary (Barnow and Smith 2009). Similarly, 
the CETA evaluations were nonexperimental. These evaluations all 
relied on the CETA Longitudinal Manpower Survey, which combined 
random samples of CETA participants with comparison group data con-
structed from the Current Population Survey. Barnow’s 1987 review 
of the CETA evaluations concludes that they relied on crude matching 
estimators, and lacked local labor market data and recent labor market 
and program participation histories. Even more sophisticated matching 
procedures have failed to consistently replicate experimental fi ndings 
(Barnow and Smith 2009; Pirog et al. 2009), and the absence of data on 
local labor markets, work, and program participation choices has been 
important in arriving at unbiased treatment effects (Card and Sullivan 
1988; Dolton et al. 2006; Heckman and Vytlacil 2007). 
The widely varying fi ndings from the CETA evaluations led to the 
USDOL decision to evaluate JTPA as a randomized experiment. Doo-
little and Traeger (1990) describe the experiment which took place in 
16 of over 600 local JTPA sites, while Bloom et al. (1997) and Orr et 
al. (1996) describe the experimental impact results. A variety of authors 
have synthesized numerous evaluations of employment and training 
programs (Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins 1997; Greenberg, Mi-
chalopoulos, and Robins 2003; Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 1999; 
LaLonde 1995). Overall, these authors report somewhat disappointing 
results. Impacts for adults are modest, with more positive effects reported 
for women than men and negligible impacts for out-of-school youth 
(Greenberg, Michalopoulos, and Robins 2003). The limited effective-
ness of job training programs is hardly surprising when we consider 
participants’ overwhelmingly low human capital levels and relatively 
small amount of job training investment.
Within the related literature on program evaluation methodologies, 
there has been a hot debate over the accuracy of these largely non-
experimental fi ndings. Researchers interested in government programs 
across the board have been investigating whether and under what cir-
cumstances carefully executed nonexperimental methods can provide 
robust estimates of treatment effectiveness. In fact, the experimen-
tal JTPA study provided data for a variety of studies that constructed 
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nonrandomized comparison groups and used various econometric cor-
rections for self-selection bias to determine how effectively they work 
compared to the experimental results. 
The approach of using experimental data to provide a benchmark 
against nonexperimental fi ndings was used initially by LaLonde (1986) 
and Fraker and Maynard (1987). Both of these studies relied on data 
from the National Supported Work Demonstration. Other related stud-
ies of this type included Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002), Diaz and 
Handa (2006), Friedlander and Robins (1995), Heckman et al. (1996, 
1998), Heckman and Hotz (1989), Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 
(1997), Smith and Todd (2005), and Wilde and Hollister (2007). 
LaLonde’s 1986 study was particularly infl uential. He demon-
strated that many self-selection correction procedures do not replicate 
estimated treatment effects in randomized experiments. In fact, non-
experimental methods were not robust to model specifi cation changes 
in his study of the National Supported Work Demonstration, and the 
effectiveness of the program or estimated treatment effects were radi-
cally different from those determined experimentally. Later, Heckman, 
LaLonde, and Smith (1999) rebutted the LaLonde (1986) study in 
defense of nonexperimental methods, noting that each estimator is as-
sociated with testable assumptions and that by systematically testing 
them, the range of results resembles those originating from experimen-
tal methods. 
The next section of this chapter provides a brief description of the 
types of parameters we may want to estimate in evaluating employment 
and training programs. After that we discuss conventional selection bias 
in studies of employment and training programs, followed by a discus-
sion of pure selection bias and the robustness of different estimators 
that attempt to correct for self-section bias. The fi nal section discusses 
what we have learned from previous studies. 
FITTING THE METHODOLOGY TO THE POLICY QUESTION 
When evaluating the impacts of any program, researchers should 
ask two questions. First, what policy question do we need to answer? 
Second, what research designs and econometric methods are best suited 
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to answer the question? In employment and training programs, income 
(Y ) is a typical outcome variable, although researchers have looked at a 
myriad of other possible outcomes, such as weeks worked, labor force 
attachment, and reliance on government cash assistance programs or 
poverty. Regardless of the outcome variable chosen (and for the pur-
poses of this discussion, we focus on income), we need to establish a 
counterfactual. For example, we want to know the incomes of individu-
als given that they participated in a training program (Y1) in order to 
compare it to the income of the same individuals without the benefi t 
of the program (Y0). In theory, a person can occupy either of these two 
potential states (treated or untreated), but in reality only one state is 
realized for a given individual. If people could occupy both states at the 
same time, then the problem of program evaluation would be easy and 
the treatment effect could be depicted as 01 YY  . Four commonly 
discussed variants of treatment effects estimates are shown in Figure 14.1.
In practice, most randomized social experiments are designed to 
obtain intent to treat (ITT) estimates (Panel A of Figure 14.1). Eligible 
participants, frequently identifi ed through administrative data, or those 
who have applied for services are randomly assigned to the treatment 
after which they comply with program requirements to some extent: 
some complete, others drop out, while still others are no-shows. When 
all individuals randomly assigned to treatment are compared to the 
randomized control group, the ITT estimates can be interpreted as the 
average impact over a sample of applicants, some of whom comply to 
some degree with the program. However, program administrators and 
supporters have often raised concerns with ITT estimates, arguing that 
they unfairly bias downward positive treatment effects by including 
the no-shows and even dropouts in the treatment group. After all, no-
shows and dropouts either received no program services or only partial 
services. As such, no-shows and dropouts should not be expected to 
benefi t either at all or fully from the program. 
Largely in response to these concerns, experimenters created the 
treatment on the treated (TT) estimates. Individuals who started but 
dropped out at some point are typically, but not always, included with 
completers in these estimates. Viewed from this perspective, TT esti-
mates are derivatives of ITT estimates—mechanical approximations 
with known properties and assumptions. 
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While most experimentors focus on ITT or TT estimation, it would 
be relatively straightforward to design a randomized experiment to 
estimate the impacts of program expansions (the local average treat-
ment effect [LATE]). However, it is likely to be diffi cult to obtain good 
average treatment effects (ATE) estimates because randomly assigned 
individuals from an eligible population may well fail to comply with the 
treatment protocols. Moreover, unless treatment is mandated by court 
order or another mechanism, the usefulness of such estimates is rather 
limited. Each of these four types of estimators is discussed below.
ITT. This estimator is depicted in panel A of Figure 14.1. In this 
case, 
ITT= )0,1|()1,1|( 01  RDYERDYE ,
including the no-shows and dropouts in the treatment group, where D = 
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Figure 14.1  Variants of Treatment Effects
up11dbwia0ch14.indd   411 6/23/2011   11:44:16 AM
412   Jung and Pirog
and R = 1 for the treatment group members and R = 0 for the controls. 
Under many circumstances this is an interesting and policy-relevant 
parameter that refl ects how the availability of a program affects partici-
pant outcomes when participation in the program is incomplete.
TT. When we want to estimate the effect of a treatment like a job 
training program on actual participants, the parameter of interest is the 
effect of TT, depicted as follows:
TT = ),1|(),1|( 01 XDYYEXDE  ,
where X is a vector of individual characteristics, D = 1 if an individual 
participates in the program, and D = 0 if they do not. 
In our example, TT could compare the earnings of vocational pro-
gram participants with what they would earn if they did not participate 
in the program. This is the information required for an “all or nothing” 
evaluation of a program and provides policymakers with information 
on whether or not the program generates positive outcomes. In panel B 
of Figure 14.1, the TT is depicted as the effect of treatment on partici-
pants. Social experiments randomly assigning eligible applicants to the 
treatment and control groups are generally considered the gold standard 
for obtaining ITT and TT estimates.1  
ATE. This is the average impact that results from randomly assign-
ing a person from the eligible population to a treatment. In panel C of 
Figure 14.1, the shaded rectangle constitutes the entire population for 
which the treatment effect is being estimated, regardless of whether or 
not they chose to participate in the program. The ATE is shown math-
ematically as
ATE = )|()|( 01 XYYEXE  .
Neither component of this mean has a sample analogue unless there 
is universal participation or nonparticipation in the program, or if par-
ticipation is randomly determined and there is full compliance with 
the random assignment. As such, the ATE can be diffi cult, sometimes 
impossible, to compute. More importantly, however, this estimator is 
typically uninteresting to policymakers, who are typically loath to force 
randomly selected individuals to participate in programs. 
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LATE. This is the effect of treatment on persons who were induced 
to participate by an expansion or increased generosity of a program 
(see panel D of Figure 14.1). For example, LATE could measure the 
effect of a change in a policy (Z) of providing a new stipend or a more 
generous stipend to vocational program participants on those induced 
to attend the program because of the new policy. LATE is shown as 
follows:
    LATE = )1)'()(|()0)'(,1)(|( 101  zDzDYYEzDzDYYE o
where D(z) is the conditional random variable D, given Z = z, and where 
'z  is distinct from z, so 'zz  . Two assumptions are required to identify 
LATE. First, Z does not directly affect the outcome and program partici-
pation is correlated with Z controlling for other factors. This is a typical 
assumption for IV estimation. Second, there must be compliance with 
the policy change such that there are no individuals who refuse to par-
ticipate if eligible and want to participate if not.2
Because it is defi ned by variation in an instrumental variable that is 
external to the outcome equation, different instruments defi ne different 
parameters. When the instruments are indicator variables that denote 
different policy regimes, LATE has a natural interpretation as the re-
sponse to policy changes for those who change participation status in 
response to the new policy. For any given instrument, LATE is defi ned 
on an unidentifi ed hypothetical population—persons who would cer-
tainly change from 0 to 1 if Z is changed. For different values of Z and 
for different instruments, the LATE parameter changes, and the popula-
tion for which it is defi ned changes. In other words, when we estimate 
the LATE parameter, we need to make sure who is possibly affected by 
the policy change from 'z  to z and how to interpret the estimated value 
in terms of relevant policy changes. 
Most randomized experiments focus on estimating the ITT or TT 
in order to answer the policy question of how a program changes the 
outcomes of eligibles or eligible applicants and actual program partici-
pants compared to what they would have experienced if they had not 
participated. The ATE estimator is infrequently used largely because 
most researchers and policymakers are reluctant to force program par-
ticipation. Finally, when programs became more generous or eligibility 
0
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is expanded, the LATE estimator can be used to obtain the incremental 
effect of the policy change. 
While random assignment studies are considered the gold stan-
dard for obtaining program impact estimates, the reality is that the vast 
majority of published evaluations are nonexperimental, with perhaps 
the exception of the randomized clinical trials in the medical literature 
(Pirog 2007). Thus, it is imperative to understand the issues relating to 
selection bias and the construction of a reasonable counterfactual. It 
is also important to follow closely the emerging literature on the non-
experimental designs, estimators and statistical approaches that give 
rise to estimates of treatment effects that better approximate those that 
would be found using random assignment studies. These issues are dis-
cussed in the next three sections of this chapter.
CONVENTIONAL SELECTION BIAS AND LESSONS FOR 
PROGRAM DESIGNS AND DATA COLLECTION 
Before addressing which econometric methods are relevant to an-
swer the policy question, we want to discuss the selection bias that 
occurs when participation in job training programs is not randomized. 
Randomization should result in statistically equivalent groups of treat-
ment and control group members in terms of both their observed and 
unobserved characteristics. This is not the case with nonexperimental 
studies, which often rely on propensity score matching, instrumental 
variable approaches, difference-in-difference techniques, and other sta-
tistical corrections to attempt to create a reasonable counterfactual or 
comparison group. 
Early in the still ongoing debate on the relative merits of experi-
mental versus nonexperimental evaluation, LaLonde (1986) pointed 
out that the use of nonrandomized comparison groups in evaluations 
can lead to substantial selection bias. Heckman et al. (1996, 1998) 
countered that LaLonde reached his conclusions incorrectly by con-
structing his comparison groups from noncomparable data sources. 
LaLonde’s comparison groups were located in different labor markets 
from program participants, and their earnings were measured using 
different questionnaires. Heckman also noted that LaLonde lacked 
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information on recent preprogram labor market outcomes, which are 
important predictors of participation in training. In sum, Heckman et 
al. (1998) concluded that simple parametric econometric models ap-
plied to bad data should not be expected to eliminate selection bias. In 
1997, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) showed how the bias found 
in estimates of treatment effectiveness can be decomposed into three 
sources. This analysis is still relevant for labor market researchers today 
who wish to construct a counterfactual or comparison group without the 
benefi t of randomization. 
The fi rst source of bias that can occur when using a nonrandom-
ized comparison group relates to differences in the values of the same 
observed characteristics in the treatment and comparison groups. This 
would occur, for example, if the treatment group included individuals 
aged 20–60 and the comparison group only included individuals aged 
30–40. 
When we have many observed characteristics, X’s, they can be 
represented as P(X), the propensity score, which is the probability of 
participation in a program based on a vector of observed individual 
characteristics. The second source of bias occurs when propensity 
scores obtained by matching on observable characteristics have differ-
ent distributions over the same range. 
The top panel of Figure 14.2 depicts a situation where both sources 
of bias are serious. In the top panel, the treatment and comparison 
groups have a modest overlap in their propensity scores, P(X). In fact, 
no comparison group members are in the left tail of the distribution for 
the treatment group, and conversely, no treatment group members are 
in the right tail of the distribution for the comparison group. This dif-
ference refl ects the fi rst source of bias. In the top panel, you can also 
see that the distributions of propensity scores over the same range are 
different. This refl ects the second source of bias. Both sources of bias 
are mitigated in the bottom panel of Figure 14.2. 
The third source of bias in estimated treatment effects is from the 
pure self-selection on unobservables such as motivation. This would 
exist, for example, if the treatment group members of a job training pro-
gram were highly motivated in contrast to comparison group members 
who lacked drive or motivation. This is the bias caused by the indi-
viduals’ self-selection behavior based on information that researchers 
cannot observe and details of which are discussed later in the chapter. 
up11dbwia0ch14.indd   415 6/23/2011   11:44:18 AM
416   Jung and Pirog
Propensity score matching can moderate bias from the fi rst two 
sources of bias. Reweighting comparison group members so that the 
distribution of the comparison group’s P(X) more closely resembles 
that of the treatment group can further reduce bias from the second 
source. Because much of the bias attributed to selection by LaLonde 
(1986) was actually due to the fi rst two sources described above, Heck-
man, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) continue to make arguments in favor 
of nonexperimental evaluations. 
CONSTRUCTING A COUNTERFACTUAL
The characteristics of different types of comparison groups, includ-
ing the randomized control group, are described below. The conclusion 
that the quality of data used to form a comparison group and the match-
ing procedures utilized are keys to reducing the conventional bias is 
based on Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), who used data from 
Figure 14.2  Two Conventional Sources of Bias
 
Treatment group  
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a randomized control group, the no-shows from the treatment group, 
the eligible but nonparticipating group, and the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP) in order to analyze the quality of the com-
parisons achieved. 
Randomized Control Group as an Ideal Comparison Group
After applying to a program and being deemed eligible, individuals 
are randomly assigned to a control group. Data from the control and 
treatment groups should have nearly the same distribution of observed 
and unobserved characteristics. Because eligible applicants from the 
same local labor markets are randomly assigned to the treatment and 
control groups, and the same survey instruments were used with both 
groups, all three sources of bias should be controlled. 
No-Shows from the Treatment Group as a Comparison Group
No-shows include individuals who are accepted to the program and 
randomized into the treatment group but who do not participate in the 
program. The simple mean difference between the treatment group and 
the no-show group without matching demonstrates that no-shows have 
similar characteristics as well as overlapping distributions of P(X). The 
main source of bias is from selection on unobservables. 
The Eligible but Nonparticipants (ENPs) as a Comparison Group
Individuals in the eligible but nonparticipating group are those who 
are located in the same labor market, and are eligible for the program 
but do not apply for the program. These individuals’ information is col-
lected by using the same questionnaire as for the treatment group. There 
were some clear differences in the characteristics and distribution of 
P(X) between the ENPs and the treatment group members. By using 
propensity score matching and reweighting observations, it is possible 
to reduce the fi rst two sources of bias as well as rigorously defi ned 
self-selection bias. While improvements in the estimated treatment ef-
fectiveness were obtained, the estimated treatment effect was still not 
equivalent to the TT estimate.  
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A Comparison Group from SIPP or Other Data Sources
To construct a comparison group, it is also possible to apply the 
eligibility criteria for a program to survey respondents in the SIPP or 
other large surveys. Two problems arise from using this approach. First, 
local labor market conditions are likely to be different for comparison 
and treatment group members when the comparison group members 
are selected from preexisting survey data. Second, data collected from 
the treatment and comparison groups are likely to come from different 
surveys or sources of measurement. In models comparing the treatment 
group with the SIPP comparison group, there was some discrepancy in 
observed characteristics and P(X). They found that the fi rst and second 
sources of bias were close to those found when using the ENPs for a 
comparison group. The discrepancies in the local labor markets and the 
questionnaires contributed to bias stemming from selection on unob-
servables; the third component of the selection bias is larger than that 
when they use ENPs. 
Discussion
When we design training programs and collect information on 
participants to evaluate program effectiveness using nonexperimental 
methods, we need to consider how to develop comparison groups. Sev-
eral factors are critical in reducing bias in our estimates of treatment 
effects: use the same questionnaire or data sources to obtain individual 
labor market outcomes and demographic information, draw individu-
als for the treatment and comparison groups from the same local labor 
markets, and use comparison group members whose observed charac-
teristics largely overlap with those of the participants. 
Restricting analyses to treatment and comparison group members 
with similar characteristics and using propensity score matching can 
reduce the fi rst and second components of conventional bias, even 
though the characteristics of the parameter that we want to estimate 
can change. However, propensity score matching has its own limita-
tions: it cannot control for self-selection on unobservables. Its uses and 
limitations are discussed with related empirical studies surveyed by 
Pirog et al. (2009). This study points out that matching is a nonpara-
metric method that is fl exible to any functional relationships between 
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outcomes and programs. However, it needs a large sample size and is 
sensitive to various matching methods. There is no clear guidance for 
superior matching procedures.
SOURCES OF PURE SELF-SELECTION BIAS
AND EMPIRICAL METHODS  
Different Sources of Pure Self-Selection Bias
There are three reasons why individuals might self-select into an 
employment and training program:
1) they know they will earn higher incomes after participating in 
the program (heterogeneous response to the program in a ran-
dom coeffi cient model); 
2) individuals select into the program because their latent or for-
gone earnings are low at the time of program entrance (time 
constant individual heterogeneity in a fi xed effect model); and
3) individuals’ earnings are dependent on previous earnings that 
are low at the time of program entrance (autocorrelation be-
tween earnings in different time periods). 
The fi rst source of self-selection implies that individuals with higher 
returns from the program are more likely to participate in training 
programs. The second source of self-selection behavior implies that in-
dividuals with low opportunity costs or low earnings capacity are likely 
to participate in training programs. The third source of self-selection 
behavior implies that the low earnings capacity that encourages pro-
gram participation at the time of participation is positively associated 
with earnings after program. Thus, the fi rst source of self-selection re-
sults in overestimates of the effectiveness of employment and training 
programs while the second and third sources of self-selection result 
in underestimates. In the employment and training literature, it is un-
derstood that all three sources of bias contribute to the phenomenon 
known as “Ashenfelter’s dip”; the fact that participants in employment 
and training programs often have earnings that are temporarily low at 
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the time of program entry but that their earnings usually rebound (even 
in the absence of program participation) (Ashenfelter 1978).    
Different empirical techniques appear to work better or worse 
depending on which sources of bias are operating. Theoretically, we ex-
pect that cross-sectional estimators provide consistent estimates only if 
there is no bias. Difference-in-differences estimators provide consistent 
estimates only if self-selection bias is coming from bias source 2. The 
AR (1) (autoregressive of order one) regression models provide consis-
tent estimates only when self-selection bias is coming from bias source 
3. The use of the instrumental variables method and the Heckman-
selection correction provides consistent estimates only if bias sources 2 
and 3 are present.3 Thus, understanding which sources of bias we have 
in the program is critical in choosing which empirical method to use to 
best answer the policy question.
In simulations, cross-sectional estimation, difference-in-differences, 
and AR (1) regression estimation work relatively well when all three 
sources of bias are present, but it appears that they work well because 
the different biases offset one another (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 
1999). Also, when bias source 1 is present, the estimation methods 
working for TT do not work for ATE. The authors argue that these pa-
rameters differ greatly because there is strong selection into the program 
by persons with high values of individual specifi c returns. However, 
they are not clear about how bias sources 1, 2, and 3 interact when dif-
ferent nonexperimental methods estimate ATE and TT. It seems that 
when all three bias sources are present, those three biases might offset 
one another. Difference-in-differences and AR (1) regression models 
also provide a similarly low bias in estimation. Finally, instrumental 
variables and the Heckman self-selection correction work best when 
bias sources 2 and 3 are present without bias source 1. However, when 
bias source 1 is present, IV and Heckman correction are the worst meth-
ods to use. 
In sum, difference-in-differences and AR (1) regression estima-
tors seem robust enough over different bias sources to estimate the TT. 
However, this does not mean that they are superior nonexperimental 
methods to others. In addition, it is not clear how offsetting of different 
bias sources works over different data and programs. Further research 
is needed.   
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NEW NONEXPERIMENTAL METHODS
Since the Heckman/LaLonde debate, a number of econometric 
methods have become more popular, and they relate directly to the 
issues of how best to estimate treatment effects for employment and 
training programs in the absence of random assignment. These ad-
ditional methods include the difference-in-differences extension on 
matching, regression discontinuity design, and the marginal treatment 
effect (MTE) using local instrumental variables. Table 14.1 presents our 
summary of these methods as well as those for “kitchen sink” regres-
sion, propensity score matching, difference-in-differences, AR (1), and 
instrumental variables methods. 
Difference-in-Differences Extension of Matching
As mentioned earlier, propensity score matching can be used to ob-
tain impact estimates for treatment group members whose observable 
characteristics overlap with those of comparison group members. Of 
course, the impact estimates will only be valid for those individuals 
whose characteristics do overlap. Within the range of overlap of observ-
ables, the “comparable” comparison group can also be reweighted to 
better represent the distribution of observed treatment group character-
istics, further reducing bias from different distributions of observables 
between treatment and comparison group members. Neither of these 
adjustments, however, controls for selection on unobservables. 
Difference-in-differences extension of matching, introduced in 
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), controls for some forms of se-
lection on unobservables: it eliminates time-invariant sources of bias 
that may arise when program participants and nonparticipants are 
geographically mismatched or have differences in their survey ques-
tionnaire. Unlike traditional matching, this estimator requires the use of 
longitudinal data, which uses outcomes before and after intervention. 
Regression Discontinuity Design
Regression discontinuity design became popular because it is easy 
to use and easy to present to a general audience. On the other hand, it 
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No No No Strict parametric assumption on a con-
trol function.
Propensity score matching Cross-sectional data 
Repeated cross-sectional data
Panel data
(Large sample is required)
No No No Flexible nonparametric method but large 
sample is required. Good at moderating 
the bias from the mismatched observed 
characteristics between the treatment 
and the comparison, and the bias from 
the mismatched distribution in the com-
mon values of observed characteristics.
Difference-in-differences Panel data No Yes No Sensitive to choosing different time 
points before and after the treatment 
period.
AR (1) regression estimator Panel data No No Yes It does not need to have outcome before 
the program; outcomes of two periods 
after the program is enough. AR (1) pro-
cess assumption itself can be restrictive 
to represent the earnings dependency in 
practice. 
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a Individuals select into the program because they know they will earn higher returns from the program.
b Individuals select into the program because their latent or forgone earnings are low at the time of program entrance.






No Yes Yes Hard to fi nd a valid instrument variable.
Difference-in-differences 
extension of matching
Panel data No Yes No Flexible nonparametric method but large 
sample is required. Good at moderating 
the bias from the mismatched supports 
between the treatment and the compari-
son, and the bias from the mismatched 






Yes Yes Yes Hard to fi nd a clear-cut participation rule 
and a large sample around the thresh-
old; requires an assumption about the 
functional form of the dependence of 
the outcome on the assignment criterion 
variable.
Estimation using marginal 




Yes Yes Yes Hard-to-fi nd valid and powerful in-
strumental variables that are needed 
to estimate a full schedule of marginal 
treatment effects.
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requires a clear-cut participation rule and a large sample around the 
threshold. It also requires an assumption about the functional form of 
the dependence of the outcome on the assignment criterion variable. It 
is not easy to fi nd data that satisfy such conditions (Pirog et al. 2009). 
Under the previous conditions, however, it works like random assign-
ment. A recent study by Battistin and Rettore (2008) uses this method 
and discusses its weaknesses and strengths. They also warn that effects 
are obtained only for individuals around the threshold for participation. 
Thus, if there is a serious heterogeneous response across the population 
of interest, it is hard to generalize the estimates.
Estimation Using MTE
The MTE is the mean effect of treatment on those with a particular 
degree of intention to participate in the program. It can vary over dif-
ferent participation rates of participants and nonparticipants, and can 
be understood as a local average treatment effect using instrumental 
variables. Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) analyze how we can estimate 
different policy parameters as weighted averages of the MTE. It is at-
tractive in the sense that we can estimate the different policy questions 
only using the MTE. However, it has its own limitation because the 
valid and powerful instrumental variables that are needed to estimate 
a full schedule of marginal treatment effects are often not available to 
researchers (Moffi tt 2008).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Because of recessions, technological advancements, global trade, 
and international migration of workers, job training programs in the 
United States have become more inclusive, pushing beyond their initial 
clientele of disadvantaged workers to additionally include more main-
stream segments of the labor force. WIA clearly refl ects this trend in 
training programs. Given the expanded scope of WIA, program evalu-
ation has become more important and far more challenging given the 
highly heterogeneous nature of the target population. 
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This chapter summarizes the previous literature related to the meth-
odology of evaluating training programs. We begin by noting that it 
is necessary to understand the policy question being posed so that the 
evaluation design can be tailored to answer that question. If policy-
makers are interested in ATEs for universal programs or LATEs that 
occur when program benefi ts or enticements are made more generous, 
then nonexperimental methods can be appropriate. After discussing the 
differences in the TT, ITT, ATE, and LATE parameters, the rest of the 
discussion focuses on the traditional question of program evaluation 
which requires estimation of the TT. This question is, how does the pro-
gram change the outcomes of participants compared to what they would 
have experienced if they had not participated? The estimated treatment 
effect for program participants allows policymakers to answer whether 
or not a program should be retained. 
Despite considerable debate in the literature, random assignment 
experiments are still considered the gold standard for such evaluations. 
If random assignment is not possible, we have learned that
• comparison groups should be drawn from the same local labor 
markets, and
• the same instrumentation should be used to collect data from 
the treatment and comparison groups.
Following these practices will reduce bias in estimated treatment 
effects. Unfortunately, this is not enough. To provide better nonexperi-
mental estimates of treatment effects, the comparison group members 
should
• have observed characteristics that span the same range of val-
ues as members of the treatment group, and 
• even if the observed characteristics span the same range, the 
distributions of these characteristics should also be the same.
Finding a comparison group that meets all of these criteria may 
well be onerous. For example, large, even very large, sample sizes are 
normally required if one uses propensity score matching to align the 
range and distributions of P(X) that represents observed characteristics, 
X’s, of the treatment and comparison groups. 
Even if all of the above criteria can be met, it is also critically impor-
tant to understand the sources of selection bias so that an econometric 
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estimator can be used to correct for that particular type or combination 
of types of bias. Recall that there are three types of bias that typically 
arise in training programs:
1) self-selection by individuals who know they will earn higher 
incomes after participating in the program;  
2) self-selection by individuals who enter a training program be-
cause their latent or forgone earnings are low at the time of 
program entrance; and
3) self-selection by individuals whose earnings are dependent on 
previous earnings that are low at the time of program entrance.
How to tease out the relative importance these sources of bias a 
priori is neither obvious nor easy. Nonetheless, it is clear that under-
standing how these sources of bias operate in any given evaluation of 
training programs is critical to choosing the most appropriate statistical 
methods.
Overall, we conclude that the choices made by evaluators regarding 
their data sources, the composition of their comparison groups, and the 
specifi cation of their econometric models will have important impacts 
on the estimated effects of training. If a researcher cannot meet the 
conditions described above, estimated treatment effects from nonexper-
imental methods can give seriously misleading advice to policymakers. 
It has sometimes been argued that randomized experiments are imprac-
tical, take too long to implement, and are costly. However, the time and 
fi nancial costs associated with collecting high-quality (usually longi-
tudinal) data for nonexperiments will likely offset any extra time or 
fi nancial costs of randomization. At the end of this exercise, we are 
forced to conclude that the logistical diffi culties encountered in imple-
menting a random assignment experiment must be weighed against the 
likelihood of giving bad advice to policymakers.
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Notes
1. Social experiments assigning eligible applicants to the treatment and control 
groups to estimate the TT often have substitutes in the control group. Substitutes 
are individuals that have similar services from other programs even if they are 
assigned to the control group. When there are only no-shows, a Bloom-estima-
tor is used to estimate the TT. When there are no-shows and substitutes, a Wald-
estimator is used to estimate the TT. For further discussions of technical details and 
assumptions, refer to Bloom (1984) and Heckman et al. (1999, pp. 1903–1905).
2. There are four types of individuals in the program participation: 1) those who are 
induced to participate in the program if eligible, 2) those who will participate in the 
program whether or not they are eligible, 3) those who refuse to participate in the 
program whether or not they are eligible, 4) those who refuse to participate if eli-
gible and want to participate if not. This second assumption for LATE eliminates 
the fourth type of individuals.  
3. The Heckman-selection correction model is also restricted by the distribution as-
sumption of unobservables.
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